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Local Public Sector Performance:
Are Wisconsin City and Village Taxes Too High?
Executive Summary
This applied research project examines questions concerning the economic efficiency of
municipal government spending and taxation levels in Wisconsin.  Using economic notions of
local government effectiveness and efficiency, a theoretical and empirical model is presented and
estimated using data from Wisconsin cities and villages.  Theory suggests that expenditure and
taxation levels are capitalized into local property values.  In short, public goods and services and
corresponding taxes are viewed as a normal good in an economic sense: more is better, too
much is bad.  From a property valuation perceptive, higher levels of public goods and services
should increase property values.  But, overprovision of the public good places downward
pressure on property values.  This inverted-U relationship is easily estimated from an empirical
perspective.  Two separate tests are estimated.  The first examines capitalization rates of service
provision (i.e., expenditures) into property values.  The second complementary test examines
capitalization rates of taxation levels (i.e., municipal taxes) into property values.  Results for
Wisconsin cities and villages suggest that service and taxation levels are positively related to
property values suggesting that neither services or local taxation is not systematically too high. In
other words, based on rigorous economic theory, spending and taxing in Wisconsin’s cities and
villages are not too high and may indeed be too low.  It is important to note that this applied
research study focuses on city and village taxation and spending, attention is not paid to public
schools, counties, towns or other special districts that have taxing authority.3
Local Public Sector Performance:
Are Wisconsin City and Village Taxes Too High?
“ My first priority will be to do as much as I can to change the perception and the reality of
Wisconsin being a high-tax state”.
Governor Scott McCallum (Wisconsin State Journal, February 12, 2001)
I- Introduction
Wisconsin has been historically
regarded as a relative high tax state.
Comparing Wisconsin’s state, county,
municipal and other local government
finances on the basis of population and/or
income to other states typically serve as the
foundation for such conclusions.  Using such
comparisons Wisconsin’s state and local
taxes per capita ranked 8
th 1997 but 9
th in
1992, a slight decline (Table 1).  For the
most current year for which the Census of
Governments is available, Wisconsin total
tax collection per person was $3,020, which
is $273 above the US average (Figure 1).
Taxes collected at the local level, however,
Wisconsin ranked 13
th in 1992 and actually
dropped to 17
th in 1997.  At $1,051 collected
per person at the local level, Wisconsin is
below the national average by $21 (Figure
2).
Table 1: Wisconsin State & Local Tax Rankings
 1997   1992
Per Capita
State and Local Taxes 8 9
Local Taxes 17 13
Per $1,000
Income
State and Local Taxes 5 4
Local Taxes 15   11
Source: US Census of Governments
On the other hand, Wisconsin’s
state and local tax collection per $1,000 of
personal income ranked 5
th in 1997 and 4
th
in 1992. Wisconsin’s collection of taxes at
the state and local level was $128 per
$1,000 of personal income, $17 higher than
the national average (Figure 3).  But is
important to note that in 1992 state and local
taxes collected was $134 in 1992, implying
that Wisconsin’s ability to pay (i.e., income)
grew faster than tax burdens. Indeed,
between 1992 and 1997, the gap between
Wisconsin and the US average declined
from $18 to $17 pre $1,000 of personal
income.
Local tax collection, on a basis of
$1,000 of personal income ranked as high
as 11
th in the nation in 1992, but dropped to
15
th five years latter in 1997.  In 1992, for
every $1,000 of personal income
Wisconsin’s local governments collect $51,
$4 higher than the national average.  But by
1997, local governments in Wisconsin
collected only $45 per $1,000 of income, a
decline of $6 while at the same time the gap
between Wisconsin and the national
average declined to $2 per $1,000 of
income.  This significant shift at the local
level, and to some extent at the state level
as well, is due to the generous state aid
programs for municipalities and public
schools.
Yet, based on such rankings elected
officials, as well as organized members of
the civil society, have been continuously
advocating lower taxes to decrease the size
of the public sector throughout Wisconsin. A
recent pledge to cut taxes came from the
recently inaugurated Governor Scott
McCallum:
“For too long Wisconsin has
ranked near the top of every
national survey when it
comes to measuring overall
tax burden. Wisconsin
taxpayers have supported
this level of taxation for too
long.”  (Wisconsin State
Journal, February 4, 2001).4
Figure 1: State and Local Taxes Per Capita (1997)




















Figure 2: Local Taxes Per Capita (1997)




















Figure 4: Local Taxes Per $1,000 of Income  (1997)




















The purpose of this applied
research project is to reevaluate the
perception of Wisconsin as an overly high-
tax state.  In our analysis, however, we will
follow a different path. Instead of focusing
on the usual interstate comparisons of tax
burden measurements, we will concentrate
on  intrastate comparisons on the
performance of local government’s in
particular Wisconsin cities and villages.
Local government is certainly the
most visible face of government in
Wisconsin. They are responsible for the
provision of essential public services and
goods as well as for the collection of taxes
and fees that amount of a considerable part
of the Wisconsin tax burden. Therefore,
opinions about the role of government, the
level of taxes in particular, will most certainly
depend on how well local governments are
performing their assigned tax and
expenditure functions.
Two different criteria will be used to
evaluate the performance of Wisconsin local
government and, ultimately, to evaluate
whether spending and taxes are too high.
The first criteria is allocative efficiency,
defined as the level of public output from
which any small increase or decrease is not
unanimously preferred by all citizens living in
the community responsible for its provision.
Any deviation from this level will always face
some objections. For the specific case of the
provision of local public goods, allocative
Figure 3: State and Local Taxes Per $1,000 of Income  (1997)




















efficiency is reached when the level of public
good or service provided is such that its
marginal cost of provision (including
production and distribution) equals the sum
of what each local resident would be willing
to pay individuallly for the good. This
condition is traditionally referred to as the
Samuelson condition or Pareto optimality.
The second criterion is that of
technical efficiency, being defined as the
ability of the government to provide goods
for its citizens at the lowest possible cost.
The cost of provision of any given public
good can be minimized through the
appropriate use of the techniques and inputs
required for its production. It can also be
minimized through the appropriate use of
the tax instruments which local governments
have available to draw resources from their
citizens in order to fund the production and
delivery of the goods and services. Our
focus here will be on the second aspect of
the technical efficiency criteria, which will be
defined simply as efficacy.
Using standard econometric
techniques and based on formal economic
models, we look at a sample of Wisconsin
cities and villages. Based on the level of
public expenditures, taxes and property
values along with housing and
socioeconomic characteristics observed at
different communities, we will be able to
assess whether Wisconsin cities and
villages are spending too much. Since cities
and village’s public expenditures are mostly
financed by taxes either raised at the local
level or raised at the state level
overspending at the local level will be
closely related to over-taxation at the local
and state level.
1
Next section goes in more detail
about the public role of Wisconsin cities and
villages, its assigned functions and the
resources they have available to perform
such functions. An intuitive way the theory
and statistical methodology behind our
analysis of public sector efficiency is
provided and then we proceed to report our
                                                          
1 Federal aids supplied as much as 10 percent of local
revenues in the 1970s, but they have since declined to
less than 3 percent with the demise of federal revenue
sharing and cutbacks in federal programs.
main findings. We repeat the discussion for
our analysis of public sector efficacy. Our
basic conclusions about public sector
efficiency and efficacy in Wisconsin are
wrapped up in the conclusions. In a
technical appendix we review the theory
more formally for the interested reader.
II- Overview of Cities and Villages in
Wisconsin
In 1999, there were 190 cities and
395 villages divided among 72 counties in
Wisconsin. Together they account for 70
percent of the state’s population. The
remaining 30 percent reside in the state’s
1265 towns.  In spite of concentrating most
of the population within their territories
Wisconsin cities and specially their villages
are small. Only 30 cities have populations
over 20,000 and 69 percent have fewer than
10,000 residents. Wisconsin’s largest city is
Milwaukee with a population of 620,609 in
1996; the smallest city is Bayfield with 678.
Villages are usually smaller than cities but
more than half of Wisconsin’s villages is
larger than Bayfield.
Most of Wisconsin’s cities adopt a
mayor-council form of government. A board
of trustees, on the other hand, usually
governs villages. Despite these
organizational differences, for the most part,
cities and villages exercise the same
statutory powers.
City and village governments also
account for almost 50 percent of all property
taxes raised and public expenditures
executed at the local level and more than 40
percent of all transfers received from the
state government (Table 2).
While towns and counties rely more
heavily on state aids as a revenue source,
cities and villages sources are more diverse,
relying on charges for services, utility
revenues, interest income, and proceeds
from long-term debt. The basic sources of
funding available to Wisconsin local
governments are summarized in Tables 3
and 4. For the most part, however, property
taxes are the major source of revenues
available to all types of local government in
Wisconsin.6
Table 2: Local government relative  participation 
(1997)  $ Millions % of total  $ Millions % of total  $ Millions % of total
Counties 1,226 44.1 1,532 52.3 4,492 45.1
Cities 1,114 40.1 1,061 36.2 4,159 41.8
Villages 231 8.3 133 4.5 748 7.5
Towns 210 7.6 203 6.9 552 5.5
Total 2,781 100 2,929 100 9,951 100
Source: Annual Fiscal Report
Property Tax Revenues Intergov'l Rev Expenditures
Table 3: Sources of Funding to Local Governments
(% of 1997 revenues)
Source Counties Towns Cities Villages
Property Taxes 27.2 37.1 26.7 30.1
State Transfers 34 35.9 25.4 17.3
Subtotal 61.2 73 52.1 47.4
Licenses 0.3 1.9 1.1 1.5
Fines 0.6 0.5 1.1 1
Pub Serv. Charges 17.9 7 12.5 13.9
Intergov'Charges 5.8 1 1.6 1.4
Long term debt 3.8 9.5 11.7 18
Interest 2 3.1 3.9 4
Utility <0.1 0.6 12.5 9.1
Other 8.4 3.4 3.5 3.7
Total 100 100 100 100
Source:Annual Fiscal Report
While towns spent nearly half of
their revenues on transportation and
counties spent more than 40 percent on the
provision of health and sanitation services in
1997, Wisconsin cities and villages usually
provided a more diversified range of
services to their citizens (Table 5). Overall
all local government levels spent the
majority of their available resources on four
broad expenditure categories: public safety,
health/human services/sanitation and
services that provide to overall life quality.
The later includes all expenditures in
recreation (e.g., parks), conservation and
development.
Given the size of their populations and the
important role that their governments have
in the provision of basic public services and
in the collection of taxes, Wisconsin cities
and villages emerge as the natural locus
where perceptions about the size and
influence of government are formed. Next
section presents the methodology used to
capture citizens’ perception about the size
and efficiency of local governments.
Table 4: Local government relative  participation 
(1997)  $ Millions % of total  $ Millions % of total  $ Millions % of total
Counties 1,226 44.1 1,532 52.3 4,492 45.1
Cities 1,114 40.1 1,061 36.2 4,159 41.8
Villages 231 8.3 133 4.5 748 7.5
Towns 210 7.6 203 6.9 552 5.5
Total 2,781 100 2,929 100 9,951 100
Source: Annual Fiscal Report
Expenditures Intergov'l Rev Property Tax Revenues7
III- Public Sector Efficiency
Part of the difficulty with the
discussion that occurs in the public
discourse about Wisconsin’s taxing and
spending levels is the lack of any rigorous
way in which to frame and address the
question.  Here there is much that economic
theory can provide as a foundation and
framework.  Here we build on the work of
Oates, Brueckner and Laffer to a less
extent.
A- Theory
If individual and businesses base
their location decisions not only on the
overall characteristics of a given community
but also on the menu of public goods and
services available along with the tax
liabilities imposed by local governments, the
overall value of property in a given
community can provide useful information
about the performance of its local
government. That will happen because
within a group of communities with similar
geographical and socioeconomic
characteristics, individuals and firms would
be willing to pay more to live and operate,
respectively, in the community, which
provides the higher quality or volume of
public services at lower tax rates. In the
short-run given a fixed land and housing
stock, this higher demand will be translated
into higher property
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of property taxes, an
increase in the level of
those public goods
would not have a trivial
effect on property
values. While an increase in local public
services will increase the menu of amenities
available to property renters or owners,
bidding up property values; on the other it
would require local governments to raise
local taxes with exactly opposite effects on
property values.
In a series of papers Brueckner
formalized the line of logic outline above in a
theoretical model that combines the property
capitalization of local taxes and
expenditures under a balanced budget.
2
Brueckner found that if government officials
behave in a manner as to maximize total
property value, the resulting decision rules
that local officials follow implies that the
Samuelson condition for allocative
efficiency, as described in the introduction,
is met.
3
This theoretical result formalized the
non-linear effects of local public
expenditures on aggregate property value
as an inverted U-shaped function with the
maximum occurring at the level where the
provision of such public goods and services
is efficient in an allocative sense.  Brueckner
further explored this result in a test is based
on the effect of changes in the level of
                                                          
2 Brueckner, Jan (1979). “Property Values, Local Public
Expenditure, and Economic Efficiency.” Journal of
Public Economics 11, 223-245
3 Appendix B summarizes Brueckner’s model.
Table 5: Expenditure allocation by Local Governments
(% of 1997 revenues)
Item Counties Towns Cities Villages
Public Safety 12.2 16 22.3 18.8
Health/Sanit. 44.1 8.1 12.7 17.6
Transportation/Roads 16.1 47.2 15.5 17
Life quality/Ammenitie 7.6 4.8 14.3 9.8
Subtotal 80 76.1 64.8 63.2
Debt 4.8 8.3 13.9 17.8
Utilities <0.1 0.6 11.9 9.8
Gen. Adm 9.3 14 6.7 8.6
Other 5.9 1 2.7 0.6
Total 100 100 100 100
Source:Annual Fiscal Report8
government expenditures on property
values.
 4
The “Brueckner relationship” for the
particular case where only one type of public
good is provided is illustrated in Figure 5.  If
local governments are currently under-
supplying the local public good (spending
too little), increases in expenditures, even if
followed by an identical increase in taxes,
should increase property values (point A). At
some point, further increases in government
expenditures would require unattractive tax
rates thus causing property values to
decline. This would indicate an over-supply
of local public goods (too much is spent) –
point C. At the efficient level, any small
increase or decrease away from it will have
no effect on property values for that
community (point B).











In order to implement Brueckner’s test one
needs to collect a sample of different
communities observations on the aggregate
value of all properties taxed in that community
along with observations on the level of public
goods and services it provides, with public
expenditures being used as a proxy for
quantities. Since property value is also affected
by other factors such as the quantity and quality
of housing in a particular community along with
the location, the wealth and the socioeconomic
characteristics of the community, measures of all
these variables also need to be collected and
factored into the test.
                                                          
4 Brueckner, Jan (1982). “A Test for Allocate Efficiency
in the Local Public Sector.” Journal of Public Economics
,19, 311-331
The next step is to use multiple
regression analysis to estimate the
“Brueckner relationship” that an increase in
a given category of local public expenditure
will have on a community’s total property
value controlling for other factors.  A
statistically positive regression coefficient on
expenditures indicates that all observations
lie to the right of the peak of the inverted U-
curve with the regression line being of the
type that passes through point A in Figure 5.
This result indicates that all communities
share a common efficiency bias, which in
this case is negative, specifically, all
communities are under-spending or at least
are not overspending.
Analogously, a statistically negative
coefficient indicates that all observations lie
to the left of the peak of the inverted U-curve
with the regression line passing through
point C in Figure 5. All communities will be
overspending or at least not under-
spending. All individuals may perceive a
decrease in expenditure as desirable.
The test is less conclusive when the
estimated regression coefficients are not
statistically significantly different from zero.
Either communities do not present a
common efficiency bias with some
communities under-spending and others
overspending or all communities are
spending at the efficient level with the
regression line passing through point B in
Figure 5.
5  Brueckner prefers the latter and
less strong interpretation of the results.
As it was mentioned above, local public
expenditures are at least partially financed
with property taxes raised locally in the
community. Because of that, the Brueckner
relationship can be reinterpreted in terms of
the effects of taxes on local public sector
efficiency, specifically, under-spending can
be associated with under-taxation, over-
spending with over-taxation.  This broad
interpretation provides a link between the
two tests provided in the applied research
project.
6
                                                          
5 Another possibility is that local public expenditures are
simply not capitalized into property values.
6 One potential criticism of the Brueckner test concerns
the functional form of the regression equation. While
Brueckner’s model finds aggregate property values to
be a single peaked concave function of local9
B- Statistical  Analysis
Data for the estimation are drawn from a
sample of Wisconsin cities and villages. Out
of a population of 585 cities and villages,
twenty-nine villages and one city were
eliminated due to missing values leaving a
total of 554 observations.  Data is drawn
from the Census, Claritas, a private vendor
of socio-economic data, and various issues
of the Wisconsin Department of Revenues”
report “County and Municipal Revenues and
Expenditures.”
The specification of the estimated model
is intended to mirror the specification of the
Brueckner model. Four general expenditure
areas are defined to measure public good
levels: expenditure on transportation (e.g.
street and highway maintenance, public
transit- (roads)); expenditure on public
safety (e.g. law enforcement, fire fighting
and prevention- (safety)); expenditure on
health, human services and sanitation
(sanitation); expenditure on life quality
goods and services (e.g. conservation and
development, parks and recreation-
(lifequality)). As we saw in Section 2,
although the responsibilities of Wisconsin
local governments go beyond these areas, it
was determined that they represent usually
more than 60 percent of all cities and
villages total local expenditures. All
measures of local public expenditures
presented above correspond to averages of
values observed between the fiscal years of
1995 and 1997.
The dependent variable, aggregate
property value, is measured by the total full
value of all taxable general property as
determined by the Wisconsin Department of
Revenue excluding the full value of
improvements to property within Tax
Increment Finance Districts (fvtif). The total
full value is determined independently of the
locally assessed value and is meant to
reflect the actual market value. The
                                                                               
government expenditures, Brueckner’s test specifies
and estimates a linear function. A superior approach
would be to employ a non-linear procedure that is
capable of suggesting the “correct” functional form. We
have chosen to employ a procedure, specifically the
Box-Cox method, which allows the data to determine if
the property value-public good expenditure relationship
is linear or non-linear.
apportionment of all taxes is measured by
fvtif.  It is also averaged between 1995 and
1997.
The total number of housing units
measures the absolute size of the
community’s housing stock in 1990
(tothouse). The quality of the housing stock
is measured by four different variables: the
percentage of houses built between 1970
and 1990 as a measure of the newness of
the housing stock (bw7090), the percentage
of houses with three or more bedrooms as a
measure of the footage of each individual
house (bed) as well as the percentage of
houses with access to public water and
sewage (pubwat and pubsew). All these
variables were also from 1990.
Socioeconomic characteristics of the
community such as the median household
income (mhincy), the proportion of residents
with at most a high school diploma (s3p573),
the percentage of senior citzens, measured
by the percentage of the current population
over 65 years of age (tpacy65), the
percentage of children, measured by the
percentage of residents with less than
eighteen years (tpacy18) along with the
community location proxyed by its latitude
(ycoord). A dummy variable, which equals 0
for cities and 1 for villages, was also used as
an explanatory variable to separate the
distinctions between cities and villages in
Wisconsin (city).
All housing characteristic regression
coefficients  (tothouse, bw7090, bed, pubwat
and pubsew) are expected to be positive.
Among the socioeconomic characteristics,
mince, being a proxy of community wealth is
expected to have a positive coefficient
estimate. On the other hand, there is no
clear indication of whether tpacy 65 and
tpacy 18 should be expected to have an
unambiguous effect. One could speculate
that  s3p573  could be just another form to
capture community wealth being a proxy of
how low the community human capital level
should be. For that reason s3p573 should
deliver a negative signal for its regression
coefficient. Given the economic relevancy of
the cities of Madison and Milwaukee and the
more developed nature of southeastern
Wisconsin in general, ycoord is expected to
have a negative effect on property values.10
Given its average population size, cities are
expected to have on average a larger
property value, which would lead us to
expect a negative regression coefficient for
city. The value and signal of the remaining
local public expenditure variables will be the
object of the regression analysis presented
below.
C- Empirical  Results
The results of the regression analysis
are presented in Table 6.  Applying the Box-
Cox procedure to the Wisconsin sample of
cities and villages produced estimated
lambdas indistinguishable from zero (both
dependent and independent variables were
transformed). This suggests that the
appropriate functional form is logarithmic.
The overall regression equation performs
strongly with an equation F-statistics of
955.16 and an adjusted R
2 of .96 which is
considered high for the cross-sectional
nature of this study.
Among the housing characteristics
variables the signs on total number of
housing units (tothouse) and the spatial
location of the municipality in Wisconsin
(ycoord) and the age measure of the
housing stock (bw7090) are positive, as
expected, and statistically significant.  The
negative and statistically significant sign of
access to public water (pubwat) is
somewhat unexpected. Less unexpected
was the insignificance of average number of
bedrooms (bed) and access to public
sewers (pubwat). Among the socioeconomic
characteristics median household income
(mhincy) and the percent of the population
with a high school diploma (s3p573) behave
as expected. The result for the dummy
variable separating cities and villages
suggest little difference between the two
types of local organization.
The results of most interest to this
applied research is the estimated
coefficients on the four general expenditure
categories (safety, roads, sanitation, and
lifequality).  In each case, the estimated
coefficient is positive and statistically
significantly different from zero at or above
the 95 percent level of confidence. The
Table 6: Estimated Coefficients 



















Note: All variables are in logs 
Dependent variable is fvtif.
955.16 
0.96 
positive and significant coefficient presents
prima fascia evidence that Wisconsin cities
and villages are not systematically over
providing public services.  By superimposing
the observed and the predicted
combinations of aggregate property value
for the different levels of local government
expenditure observed in our sample in each
of the four different categories helps
illustrate this latter conclusion (Appendix
Figures A1 to A4).
These results provide strong evidence
that cities and villages in Wisconsin are not
systematically over-spending and may
indeed be under-spending. We could use
this result to conclude that tax cuts, if
followed by a correspondent decrease in
disposable revenues at the local level and,
thus, a decrease in expenditures, contrary to
general perception, would not make
Wisconsin citizens better off.11
IV- Public Sector Efficacy
In the previous section we have found
some preliminary evidence that Wisconsin
cities and villages have not been spending
too much in the provision of their public
services. Our results also indicated that a
decrease in expenditures would not result in
a positive outcome for any Wisconsin
resident. We used this result to conclude
that tax cuts, if followed by a correspondent
decrease in disposable revenues at the local
level and, thus, a decrease in expenditures,
contrary to general perception, would not
make Wisconsin citizens better off.
A- Theory
An important assumption behind the
Brueckner argument was that a decrease in
tax rates would necessarily decrease
revenues. A common argument against this
logic would be that state and local
governments are not using their tax
instruments appropriately in order to
maximize revenue collection. By decreasing
tax rates they would be generating
incentives for existent firms in the locale to
hire more workers, increase their
investments. They could even go beyond
that by attracting new residents or
businesses as a consequence of such tax
cuts. In other words, taxes that are too high
drive economic activity out of the region.
Behind this argument is the idea of public
sector efficacy where private resources
should be collected at the lowest cost for
society.
This argument is better illustrated in the
famous Laffer curve, which expresses total
revenues as an inverted-U function of state
or local tax rates.  The curve, as presented
in Figure 6, is divided in two segments: the
upward sloping portion of the curve is called
the “normal” range and the downward-
sloping segment is the “prohibitive” range.
Right in the middle is the point where tax
revenues are maximized and where local
government activities are performed with
efficacy.  Tax cuts advocates would argue
that tax rates are beyond their maximum
and thus in the prohibitive range.   The logic
is remarkably similar to the Brueckner
relationship outlined above.
The total amount of revenues collected
from a given tax can be seen as the product
of an average tax rate by the tax base.  For
an income tax, the total tax base would be
the sum of wages and profits.  Having this
concept in mind, a change in a marginal tax
rate would have two effects on the amount
of tax revenues collected from that tax: a
direct or first order effect, immediately
captured through the average tax rate, and
an indirect or second order effect captured
by the tax base.
7
Consider, for instance, a tax cut
implemented by a decrease in property tax
rates. If the total tax base is unchanged, a
decrease in marginal tax base will decrease
the total amount of revenues collected
simply because each individual taxpayer will
be paying less in taxes. A tax cut will,
however, increase after tax wages and
return to capital. That could result in an
increase in investment by firms, more jobs,
higher profits and a higher tax base.
Thus, the net effect of a tax cut will
depend on the balance between the positive
and second order effect. A negative net
effect implies that a tax cut will decrease tax
revenues.  The direct effect dominates the
indirect over the normal range where an
increase in taxes will increase revenues. An
increase in taxes will decrease tax
revenues. This net positive effect decreases
as we move towards the tax rate where
revenues are maximized, becoming
negative after that. A negative effect reflects
that the indirect effect now dominates the
direct effect. An increase in taxes under this
prohibitive range will now decrease tax
revenues. The rationale for each segment of
the Laffer curve was based on this balance.
B- Statistical  Analysis
As it is formally derived in the appendix,
the elasticity of the property value with
respect to changes in the property tax rate
(i.e., the shape and sensitivity of the
inverted-U curve) assumes a central role in
the determination of the net effect.  If the
absolute value of the property value
elasticity is greater than one a tax rate cut
                                                          
7 This argument is formalized  in the Appendix12
will decrease revenues meaning that the
economy would be in the normal range of
the local Laffer curve (local revenue hill).
Otherwise, a tax cut will increase revenues.
In this case the local economy would be in
the prohibitive range of a possible local
revenue hill. Local public sector efficacy will
be achieved if the absolute value of the
property value elasticity is one.  Or as in the
case of the Brueckner test, there is no
systematic evidence of either over- or under-
taxation.   Simply estimating the elasticity of
property values with respect to the property
tax rate and testing this estimate against a
null equal to negative one can implement a
test of local public sector efficacy.
Using the same sample of Wisconsin
cities and villages, the elasticity of property
value with respect to the property tax rate
was obtained by regressing the full value of
property in a given community (fvtif),
described before as our proxy for the base
of the property tax, on different proxies of
local tax rate, controlling for the same set of
housing, and socioeconomic characteristics
used in the Brueckner test, as well as for
intergovernmental transfers (transfers).
8
Within a given municipality different
classes of property receive different tax
treatments and rates. We have constructed
a unique tax rate that tries to summarize the
average burden imposed on a given
community by its property tax schedule. Two
proxies for a proportional and effective local
property tax rate were obtained by dividing
the total amount of property tax revenues
raised in a given community by two
alternative bases: aggregate income earned
by community residents and aggregate
property values.  Behind the choice of each
base is one assumption with respect to the
incidence of the property tax.  Aggregate
income would be the appropriate base if
property owners were able to shift the tax
forward to renters with property values being
the default if taxes were not shifted.
Having these in mind the computed
“income tax rate” (taxraty) corresponds to
the proportional tax rate having aggregate
community income, measured in $1,000, as
                                                          
8 See the Appendix for a fuller justification of this
specification.
the tax base while taxratp is the tax rate
using aggregate property values as the
base.
C- Empirical Results
Given the intrinsic non-linearity in
the relationship between property values
and tax revenues, a Box-Cox procedure was
used in order to suggest the most
“appropriate” functional form.  As in the
Brueckner test of allocative efficiency,
lambdas indistinguishable from zero were
generated indicating that the appropriate
form would be logarithmic.
9 In a regression
in logs, elasticities between dependent and
independent variables are equivalent to
regression coefficients.  It suffices,
therefore, to look at their estimates to make
inferences about overall local public sector
efficacy in Wisconsin.
Given two tax rate measures, two sets of
regression analysis are reported (Tables 7
and 8).  The results of regressing the
compute income tax rate (taxraty), plus the
relevant control variables, on total property
value (fvtif) are presented in Table 7, while
the results using the aggregate property tax
rate (taxraty) are presented in Table 8.
Overall, both regression equations perform
well given the cross-sectional nature of the
data with the equation F-statistics being
1814.01 and 1439.64, respectively.  In
addition, the separate equations explain
over 90 percent of the variation in property
values (i.e., adjusted R
2 equal to .96 and
.95, respectively).
Control variables that seem to have the
strongest positive impact on aggregate
property values include the age of the
housing stock, with newer construction
having a greater positive impact than older
construction, household income levels and
the size of the typical house as measured
                                                          
9 Both dependent and independent variables were
transformed.13


















Note: All variables are in logs
Dependent variable is fvtif.
1439.64
0.95
by number of bedrooms.  A higher
percentage of the population that is young
seems to place downward pressure on
values as does access to public water
supplies.  This latter result, much like with
the Brueckner test above, is somewhat
unexpected.  The remainder of the results
on these control variables can be reviewed
at the reader’s leisure.
The elasticity of property values with
respect to changes in both measures of
local tax rates revealed themselves to be
positive and statistically different from zero
and thus also statistically different from
negative one under a two-tailed test. In other
words, tax rates broadly defined for
Wisconsin cities and villages are not
sufficiently high to starve-off economic
activity.  Figures 6 and 7 help illustrates this
point by superimposing the observed and
the predicted combinations of aggregate
property value – the size of the tax base in
question – for the range of average taxes
observed in our sample of Wisconsin cities
and villages.
These results suggest that
Wisconsin cities and villages are not over-
taxing their citizens. A consequence of that
is that tax cuts in the property tax schedules
would not improve the revenue-raising
capacity of cities and villages.
 V-Conclusion:
This applied research report
represented a rigorous theoretical and
analytical attempt to better evaluate the
performance of the local public sector in
Wisconsin.  Instead of limiting our analysis
to interstate comparisons of tax burden, we
decided to take a closer look at how
Wisconsin local governments, in particular
its cities and villages have been using their
tax and expenditure functions.
For Wisconsin cities and villages,
taxes are simply not a strain on the local
economy and indeed, the services that
these taxes support, such as police, roads
and parks, directly and indirectly benefit
Wisconsin residents.  Based on these
results as well as other applied studies, the
debate should not focus on absolute levels
of spending and taxation, but the mix
between service and taxation rates.
Wisconsin residents and businesses benefit
from the services cities and villages provide



















Note: All variables are in logs
Dependent variable is fvtif.
1814.01
0.9614
and the corresponding level of taxation has
not counteracted those benefits.
Based on the Brueckner’s test for
allocative efficiency in the local public sector
and on a sample of Wisconsin cities and
villages, we did not find evidence that
Wisconsin city and village governments
were over-spending.  This result seems to
indicate that a decrease in taxes leading to a
decrease in local expenditures would not
make Wisconsin cities and village’s
residents better off and may indeed make
them worse off.
One could argue that, even tough
there seems to be no evidence of misuse of
public resources, the same level and quality
of public services and goods could be
provided at a lower cost for Wisconsin
residents. Based on the idea of the Laffer
curve and on the concept of public sector
efficacy, we started touching this issue by
asking whether the same level of property
tax revenues, the most important source of
funding at the local level, could be raised
with a lower property tax rate. Our results
indicated that a decrease in the current
average property tax rates observed in each
city or village in Wisconsin will necessarily
imply a decrease in the total amount of tax
revenues.
Our results bring a very different
picture to the perspective of Wisconsin
being a high tax state. While, there is some
clear indication that their performance falls
short from what should be expected of
efficient and effective governments, cutting
taxes, at least local taxes, does not seem to
be the answer to fostering better local
governments.  Indeed, the results suggest
that Wisconsin cities and villages may be
under-providing key services.
In the end, Wisconsin residents
value the services that are being provided
by cities and villages.  It is a general
misperception that taxes are too high and
that the local economy is suffering as a
result.  These results suggest quite the
opposite; cities and villages may be
spending too little on key services.  In the
end people and businesses acknowledge
that there is no free lunch and that key
services are of value and that taxes must be
levied to pay for those services.  If the
citizenry perceive that they are “not getting
what they pay for,” then potentially serious
problems exist.  The results of this applied
research effort suggest that Wisconsin cities
and villages are not to that point.
It is important to draw attention to
the limitations of this study.  First and
foremost, we focus on cities and villages, no
attention is paid to other jurisdictions that
have taxing authority including the public
school system, county and town
government, or overall state tax burdens.
Clearly, the broader question “are overall tax
burdens too high in Wisconsin” is not
addressed.  The tiered system of local
government in Wisconsin, and indeed
throughout much of the Midwest, greatly
complicates the ability to taxpayers to
separate out the individual affects of
separate units of government.  This affect,
commonly referred to as “fiscal illusion” is
the subject of future analysis.15
Figure A1: Property Value (fv) vs Lifequality (life)- Observed (x) and Predicted Values
Figure A2: Property Value (fv) vs Roads (roads)-  Observed (x) and Predicted Values
fv
roads










Figure A3 Property Value (fv) Vs Sanitation (sanit)- Observed (x) and Predicted Values
fv
sanit




Figure A4: Property Value (fv) vs Public Safety (safety)- Observed (x) and Predicted Values
fv
safety




Figure A5: Property value (fv) vs Local Tax $ paid for every $1,000 of income (taxraty)






Figure A6: Property value (fv) vs (Local Taxes/full value)*1000-taxratp.






A. The Brueckner Model
This section of the appendix
formalizes the arguments on the derivation
of the Brueckner curve by summarizing the
main steps for its derivation. (This Appendix
draws from Deller (1990), Regional Science
and Urban Economics, 20:395-406)
The analysis begin by assuming that
preferences are identical and rents vary in a
way that each consumer in a given income
group achieves the same level of utility
across all governmental jurisdictions. The
utility function for the ith individual can be
written
u = u (hi,g, xi) (A1)
where g is the level of a public good, hi is a
measure of housing services consumed and
xi is a numeraire composite good consumed
by the ith individual. Since the level of utility
achieved msut be the same for all
individuals with a given income, the utility in
eq.(A1) must satisfy
u(hi, g, xi) =  (yi)( A 2 )
where yi is the income of the ith individual
and utility is non-decreasing in income
(’0).
Defining Ri as the rent of the ith
individual must pay for housing services hi,
given public consumption g, the budget
constraint of the ith consumer is xi + Ri = yi.
Rearranging the budget constraint and
substituting, eq.(A2) can be restated as
u (hi,g, yi-Ri) =  (yi)( A 3 )
Eq.(A3) implicitly defines the bid-rent
function, which gives rent as a function of
housing services, public good consumption,
and income. For a given level of income and
hence some fixed level of utility, the effect of
a change i the other arguments in eq.(A3)
on rent can be determined.
Ri = R(hi, g, yi)( A 4 )
Totally differentiating eq.(4) yields eq.(A5)
where the numerical subscripts denote
partial derivatives and i indicates that the
utility function is evaluated at i’s
consumption bundle.
    u1i dhi + ui2 dg – ui3dRi = 0 (A5)
By holding housing services fixed,
the effect of a change in the public good
level on rent can be determined by
rearranging eq.(A5):
 Ri/gi = ui12ui3 >0. (A6)
The implication of eq.(A6) is that a higher
level of public good results in higher rent.
Note that the ratio of partial derivatives in
eq.(A6) is equal to the marginal rate of
substitution (MRS) between public good and
the composite good.
To complete the model it is
necessary to examine the value of property.
In a perfect competitive market, the value of
the property is equal to the net rent received
discounted over time:
Vi = (Ri –Ti)/ (A7)
where Vi is the value of the ith property, Ti is
the property taxes paid on the ith property
and   is the discount rate. Total property
value is the sum of the values of all
properties:









() /  (A8)
With a balanced government
budget, the total amount of property tax paid
equals the total cost of providing the public
good. Since the total cost will be a function
of the public good level, c (g), eq. (A8) can
be written as
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Suppose now that the public good
level is chosen to maximize total property
value. Since it can be shown that V is a
strictly concave function of g under standard
assumptions, maximization requires that
V/g = 0. But since the last term in
eq.(A10) is marginal cost of producing an
additional unit of the public good and the
sum of Ri/g is equal to the sum of the
marginal rates of substitution across
individuals, V/g = 0 implies the Samuelson
condition for allocative efficiency in public
good provision.
Thus, if government officials behave
in a manner as to maximize total property
value, the resulting first-order condition
implies that the Samuelson condition for
Pareto-Efficiency is met.
B. Test for Local Public Sector Efficacy
Let G = c (g) be the total cost required to
provide the level of g of the local public
good.  The local government budget
constraint is given as
Gi = i Vi + Z (B1)
The cost required to provide the local public
good is financed with a tax revenues on
property (Ti =i V i), whose total base
amounts to the sum of all property in that
particular community as well as with
intergovernmental transfers.
10  Eq.(B1)
implicitly determines g as a function of i and
Z. Recall from eq.(A7) that Vi is a function of
Ti and Ri. Recall also from eq.(B4) that Ri is
a function of hi, g and yi. Thus, Vi is
ultimately a function of the property tax rate
(i), the level of public services provided (g),
as well as a function of housing and
socioeconomic characteristics of the
community.
Community i revenue frontier is
defined as the amount of disposable
revenues it has available being specified as:
      = i Vi (i, Z, hi, yi) + Z (B2)
                                                          
10 Transfers are assumed to be determined
exogenously in this model. In reality given for instance
revenue sharing transfers they would be also be a
function of other variables in the model such as income,
housing characteristics or even government
expenditures.
A small decrease in the property tax
rate (i), when matched with adjustments in
local public goods as required in the
community budget constraint- eq.(B2),
results in an equilibrium balanced budget
change in community revenues of:
= i Vi + i  Vi. (B3)
The first term -i V i – measures the direct
revenue effect of a small increase in the
property tax rate. The second term
measures the indirect effect of the rate
increase as local tax bases respond to
changes in local tax rates and to balanced
budget adjustment in G for given levels of hi
and yi.
The second term can also be written
as a function of the elasticity of the property
tax base with respect to small changes in









In order to see that just isolate Vi in (B4),
substituting in the second-term in (B3). The
expression for the indirect effect is now i
Vi and eq.(B3) is reduced to
= (1+) i Vi (B5)
Thus, the effect of a small decrease
in property tax rates will depend on the
signal and magnitude of . If  >-1, >0, a
tax rate cut will decrease revenues meaning
that the economy would be in the normal
range of the local Laffer curve (local revenue
hill). Otherwise,  <0, and a tax cut will
increase revenues. In this case the local
economy would be in the prohibitive range
of a possible local revenue hill. Local public
sector efficacy will be achieved if =-1.
A test of local public sector efficacy
can be implemented by simpling estimating
the elasticity of property values with respect
to the property tax rate. A statistically
significant elasticity (positive or negative)
indicates the existence of a common
inefficacy bias among the local government
units in the sample.